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The Role of Checklists and Human Factors for Improved Patient Safety in 
Plastic Surgery 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the last twenty years, there has been increased attention to 
improving all aspects of patient safety and, in particular, the important 
role of checklists and human factors. This article gives a condensed 
overview of selected aspects of patient safety and aims to raise the 
awareness of the reader and encourage further study of referenced 
literature, with the goal of increased knowledge and use of proven safety 
methods. The CME questions should help indicate where there is still 
potential for improvement in patient safety, namely in the field of non-
technical skills.  
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Introduction 
 
The important role of human factors in patient safety has been extensively 
studied in the last twenty years. From this focus, many useful tools, such 
as surgical checklists and techniques of Crew Resource Management 
(CRM), have been introduced into surgical practice. There is scientific 
evidence that these tools contribute greatly to patient safety, if used 
properly. The purpose of this article is to give a condensed overview of 
selected aspects of patient safety as well as to provide a better 
understanding of the significant role of human factors in improving patient 
safety. The reader is encouraged to use proven patient safety methods 
while considering the human factors. The extensive reference list provides 
additional resources for further reading on this critical subject. 
 
 
 
Preventable Adverse Effects 
 
Following the publication of To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health 
System, by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in the year 2000, awareness 
for the need to prevent human error grew among the medical 
community1. It also became evident that human errors were the main 
cause of preventable adverse events in surgery. Preventable adverse 
effects refers to harm from medical care rather than an underlying disease 
that occurred due to error or failure to apply an accepted strategy for 
prevention.2 Acknowledging that «Systems that rely on error-free 
performance are doomed to fail», a lack of appropriate measures for the 
sake of patient safety was established.3 While much effort has always 
been made to train surgeons and operating room staff in their knowledge 
and technical skills, the aspects of non-technical skills, namely team work, 
leadership, situational awareness, decision making, task management, 
and communication, have long been neglected.4,5,6 
 
 
 
Checklists 
 
Surgical checklists have been increasingly used since 2009, especially 
after the publication of the first global survey on the use of a surgical 
checklist by Haynes made it clear that this tool, adopted from the aviation 
industry, would have an increasing impact on patient safety.7 
 
Much of the present literature proves that the introduction of checklists 
has had a positive impact for safety.8,9 But there have also been critical 
reports on their effect.10,11,12 Careful analysis of these reports shows that 
the lack of positive impact was due to the expectation of immediate 
measurable results following the introduction of the safety checklist, when 
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in reality, the process represents a gradual, step-by-step improvement 
plan. Furthermore, success can only be achieved if the leadership pays 
close attention to the quality of the checklist and the performance of the 
teams that use them. Furthermore, it is well documented that “safety 
checklists are beneficial for OR teamwork and communication and this 
may be one mechanism through which patient outcomes are improved”.13 
 
It is important to note that the World Health Organization (WHO), when it 
introduced its surgical checklist in 2009, indicated that ‘This checklist is 
not intended to be comprehensive. Additions and modifications to fit local 
practice are encouraged’.14 And the Implementation Manual for checklists 
emphasizes the necessity of modifying the checklist in order to promote a 
culture of safety.15 This indicates that the WHO checklist should only be 
used as an example or guideline and that a checklist has to be adapted to 
the specific needs of its users. Or, as Harden says, “While powerful, 
checklists are not ’one size fits all’ and must be customized to local 
practices, which is especially true in a plastic surgeon’s office.” 16 
Furthermore, different surgical specialties, like plastic surgery, will have 
different needs, and a checklist will only be well accepted by the surgeons 
and staff if it is designed by a plastic surgery team.17 While the support of 
hospital leadership is essential for the success of any safety measure, a 
top-down enforcement will only create a false feeling of safety. 
Acceptance of a checklist comes from participation of the users in the 
design. 
 
The WHO checklist is essentially a perioperative checklist. Efforts to 
expand the checklist concept to a “practice checklist” covering the 
patient’s course from initial consultation all the way through postoperative 
care, have been proven to contribute to better safety. 18,19 
 
With the introduction of surgical checklists, especially after 2009, much 
importance has been given to filling out a specific form with checkmarks 
and signatures. This may be useful to monitor the compliance of the 
users, but documentation and administrative control must not be the 
purpose of a checklist as this is contrary to all safety-relevant efforts. 
Aviation has proven that reading though a checklist without a pen is just 
as useful. Attempts to run checklists without check-marking items on a 
paper with a pen should be encouraged as long as they fit the needs and 
culture of a team.20 
 
Implementation of a checklist without team training is not useful.21,22 Of 
course, the concept of a team is completely different in healthcare, as 
compared to military or sports, for example. For office-based surgery and 
small surgery centers where a surgeon is in control of staff and their 
training, it is possible to achieve a concept of true teams. In many other 
settings, like in large hospitals, it has been noted that in surgery, teams 
are actually “teams in name only”, because “union work rules, financial 
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constraints, and restriction of flexibility have discouraged most hospital 
administrations from creating and implementing true teams”.23 Teams are 
put together for each operation. They consist of professional individuals 
who often barely know each other and who sometimes work together for 
the first time.24 They have not been trained together. This makes team 
behavior challenging. Nevertheless, it should be considered an imperative 
of surgical leadership to address these difficulties and find innovative 
solutions that fit into the operating room workplace and its culture.25  
 
Surgeons’ leadership reflects in the fact that as far as surgical safety 
checklist performance is concerned, it is better when surgeons lead the 
checklist process and when all team members are present and paused.26 
 
Checklist completion has proven to be an essential factor for outcomes. 
While mortality was not significantly reduced, Mayer et al. reported that 
“complications could be prevented if full completion of the checklist was 
implemented“.27 
 
 
 
 
Addressing human factors with Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
 
Airlines introduced Crew Resource Management (CRM), the concept of 
maximizing effectiveness and safety by optimal utilization of all available 
resources of a team, especially the human factor, about 40 years ago as 
an important safety measure.28 Although the work of a cockpit crew 
differs in many ways from that of a surgical team, many mental processes 
used for ensuring safety of the operations are common: communication, 
situational awareness, stress management, interpersonal interactions, and 
teamwork. These processes can be improved by CRM, which typically 
addresses non-technical skills. 
 
CRM programs require time and money, but they have proven to offer a 
high return on investment.29 A “CRM crash course” will not produce long 
term effects, and it is not enough to think that blindly copying a tool from 
aviation will improve safety, as we may have tended to believe. The U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) concluded in a recent report that we wrongly were 
hoping to find solutions to medical errors by simply adopting some 
techniques drawn from aviation and other “safe industries”. On the 
contrary, “making patients safe will require ongoing efforts to improve 
practices, training, information technology, and culture. It will need top-
down resources and leadership, accompanied by bottom-up wisdom and 
innovation. It will depend on a strong policy environment that creates 
appropriate incentives, while avoiding an environment in which providers’ 
enthusiasm and creativity are sapped by an overly rigid, prescriptive 
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bureaucracy and set of rules.”30 In summary, it has to be accepted that 
safety concepts cannot be borrowed and adopted on a 1:1 scale from 
aviation, but need to be developed by healthcare specialists for their 
specific use. 
 
 
Speaking up and stopping the line 
 
Speaking up and encouragement to do so can be considered to be an 
essential element of Crew Resource Management (CRM).31,32  There are 
numerous clinical examples to illustrate how speaking up can prevent 
adverse events.33 However, there are many reasons why nurses, for 
example, may not speak up to a surgeon if they notice a problem, i.e. fear 
of being ridiculed for perhaps being incorrect, or the fear of being blamed 
by a superior for interfering. On the other hand, analysis of problems, 
major complications, or casualties shows that in a majority of the cases 
someone along the line saw an issue arise and did not mention it. 
Encouragement to speaking up and creating a climate allowing all 
members of a team to speak up without the risk of being punished is 
therefore a true act of medical leadership. Patient care is the foremost 
concern of the operating room staff and the surgeon should be aware of 
each team member’s contribution to the positive outcome of an operation.  
Stopping the line is a technique used in the automobile industry in which 
all employees on the assembly line have the power and responsibility to 
stop a process whenever they notice a defect or safety issue on the 
assembly line.34 
In healthcare, and especially in surgery, all team members must be 
empowered to stop the line if they sense or discover an essential safety 
breach.35 
Structured language can make it easier to speak up and be assertive 
when it's needed. Using a "script" of set phrases that the team has agreed 
upon in advance can make interactions more predictable and less 
"personal."36 
 
While a stop-the-line expression must be clearly understood as such by all 
members of a team, it is useful that it does not sound too alarming. A 
typical script to stop the line is “I need clarity”. 
 
 
 
Patient involvement 
 
Patients are, of course, the ones most motivated to care about their 
safety. This has been demonstrated by their support to the delivery of 
safety improvements.37 Therefore, we must not neglect to include patients 
in our safety protocols. Especially in plastic surgery, where many 
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operations are done under local anesthesia, it makes sense to involve the 
patient in checklists and encourage them to speak up. This will not break 
down the doctor-patient relationship, but on the contrary, emphasize the 
partnership.38 
 
 
 
 
Self-assessment of safety status; fatigue 
 
All healthcare professionals should consider their own assessment of their 
ability to perform correctly a personal responsibility. Such an assessment 
should be done before surgery by every member of the team, including the 
surgeon. This is also the occasion for speaking up about safety relevant 
issues. In Team Strategies & Tools to Enhance Performance & Patients 
Safety (Team STEPPS), AHRQ gives an example of how such an assessment 
can be conducted.39 It must be emphasized that this assessment is a private 
matter. Obligation to document or report it will be counter-productive. 
However, in some situations a team member may be comfortable to 
communicate personal matters to other members of the team, for example, 
fatigue. 
 
Fatigue as a safety issue is well recognized and dealt with in aviation.40 In 
medicine, it is often neglected and most probably underreported, possibly 
due to a culture where surgeons feel weak if they admit fatigue. Fatigue 
must not necessarily prevent someone from working in a surgical team, 
but it may be something to communicate to other team members. A 
culture where someone is allowed (but not forced) to say “I slept only 
three hours last night because my baby was sick” will create better team 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
Pre-operative marking and safety 
 
It is uncontested that pre-operative marking helps to avoid operations of 
the wrong patient or the wrong side. However, it has other positive effects 
for patient safety, namely the fact that it lets the patient participate in the 
safety measures about his/her surgery and shows the efforts being made. 
Thus, it is a perfect occasion for patient involvement. 
A standardized way of marking will help to avoid misunderstandings. 
Masud et al. recommended the use of an arrow to mark the correct side.41 
This will avoid wrong interpretations. Indeed, an arrow leaves no doubt 
which side has to be operated, whereas a cross could be interpreted as a 
NO. (Fig. 1, Fig. 2) 
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The positive impact of pre-operative marking should not draw attention 
away from other safety considerations, namely hygiene. Rooney et al. 
tested the use of the same marking pen for a series of patients and found 
no risk for sterility.42 But the discussion about the safety of this method is 
controversial, and other authors do report potential problems.43,44 Water-
based pens especially carry a potential danger of cross-infection.45 
Furthermore, marking pens make microlesions to the skin, which could 
become contaminated with hospital germs. Therefore, our 
recommendation for surgical marking is to use the same criteria as for 
hand hygiene.46 Single-use marking pens should thus be recommended 
for surgical marking. 
 
 
 
Human factors in long operations 
 
Plastic surgery often implies long operation times and human factors have 
a particular significance. 
 
It has been shown that the risk of retained surgical items – a never event! 
- is higher in longer operations.47 In plastic surgery, where long 
operations are common, it has been demonstrated that surgery duration 
is an independent predictor of complications, with a significantly increased 
risk above 3 hours.48 Long surgeries have several other impacts that can 
influence patient safety due to human factors.49 These include a greater 
number of handovers, pointing to the usefulness of structuring 
handovers.50 Fatigue becomes increasingly relevant with prolonged 
operations and must be dealt with. Planning micropauses during such 
surgeries may be a way to prevent fatigue and associated loss of 
accuracy.51 Basic human needs such as eating, drinking, and eliminating 
become increasingly important with longer operating times and may 
influence patient safety.52 
 
 
 
Smartphone use and other distractions 
 
Originally, the risks described for patient safety with regard to cell phones 
have been those of unperceived contamination close to the patient.53 With 
the increased use of personal smartphones, a new dimension of human 
factors has entered the operating room. While there is no evidence so far 
to show that regulating smartphone use in the OR improves patient 
safety, it seems to be common sense that the distraction caused by their 
use, especially if used for texting or writing emails, keeps staff from 
fulfilling other tasks, like observation of the surgery.54, 55,56 
Other human-caused distractions have an influence on patient safety, too.  
An observational study by Wheelock et al. showed that the most prevalent 
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distractions for surgeons were those initiated by external staff, followed 
by case-irrelevant conversations. Case-irrelevant conversations were 
associated with poorer team performance. Irrelevant conversations 
initiated by surgeons were associated with lower teamwork in surgeons. 
In contrast, Weigl et al. found that case-irrelevant communications may 
be beneficial for reducing mental fatigue and stress in routine cases, while 
procedural interruptions may contribute to surgeons' mental focus 
deteriorating.57,58 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This review of specific topics of patient safety shows there is much 
potential for improvement in this area. The significance of human factors 
and non-technical skills for the safety of patients in all of healthcare, and 
especially in surgery, has been demonstrated by many studies. In 
addition, the introduction of surgical checklists in 2009 has contributed to 
an increasing consciousness for these and other safety improvement tools. 
However, further studies are necessary to assess long-term success. 
It is the hope of the authors that the selected topics covered in this 
article, along with the CME questions and answers, will help the reader 
find possible gaps in their own activity and encourage further reading 
about patient safety in the literature referenced here and elsewhere.  
 
  
Published in final edited form as: Plast Reconstr Surg. 2017 Dec;140(6):812e-817e.  
doi: 10.1097/PRS.0000000000003892 
Legends: 
 
Fig. 1: This way of marking the hand to be operated could be interpreted 
as “Stop, do not operate the left hand!” 
 
 
Fig. 2: An arrow leaves no doubt which hand is to be operated. 
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